Hold-up Problem and the Optimal Allocation of Control Right:From the Perspective of the Investor

• Main Authors: GUANG CHEN, 陳光
• Other Authors: Shul-John Li
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2016
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/4jx246

碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 104 === The thesis analyzes the design of incomplete contract from the perspective of control right allocation to improve the efficiency of enterprise financing. It considers hold-up problems between manager and investor in enterprise financing from the standpoint of investor, analyzes the payoff rules of equilibrium with control right and chooses the optimal contract. In the equilibrium of a given control right, the thesis discovers that only two control allocations are optimal in equilibrium: either exclusive investor control or a contingent control allocation, which is the same as Yerramilli (2011). However, Yerramilli must make strict assumptions to analyze hold-up or renegotiation problems from the standpoint of manager. This thesis not only has no such disadvantages, but also makes the conditions of optimal contract more accurate and general. It is sufficient to improve and supplement Yerramilli’s model and fix some errors.