Oligopolistic competition in heterogeneous goods market: optimal location and quality position of firms

碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 104 === This paper contains two topics. One is the optimal location, the other is quality position of firms. One of the topics extends Barbell model which has the same size’s markets at the end of a straight line’s both side. There are n_A and n_B retailers respectively...

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Main Authors: Wen-cheng Lin, 林文丞
Other Authors: Ya-po Yang
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2016
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/qkcx4s
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spelling ndltd-TW-104NSYS53890112019-05-15T23:01:38Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/qkcx4s Oligopolistic competition in heterogeneous goods market: optimal location and quality position of firms 異質性產品廠商的競爭:廠址區位決策與品質定位選擇 Wen-cheng Lin 林文丞 碩士 國立中山大學 經濟學研究所 104 This paper contains two topics. One is the optimal location, the other is quality position of firms. One of the topics extends Barbell model which has the same size’s markets at the end of a straight line’s both side. There are n_A and n_B retailers respectively located on the both side, having to buy the product form the wholesaler then sell to the customers. Additionally, retailers would absorb the transport cost and fixed cost. We discuss how the numbers of retailers affect the wholesaler’s location and after the free entry happened. Given n_A = n_B = n condition, under the uniform pricing, we derive the optimal location would move from any place to 1/2 when the numbers of retailers increase gradually. Under the discriminatory pricing, the optimal location would move from the end of both side to any place when the numbers of retailers increase gradually. Furthermore, the social welfare and total output may higher under the discrimination depend on the numbers of retailers. Then we allow the outside retailers to entry the markets, simply get the familiar results with above. The other topic is we assume that there is a monopolist producing the higher (lower) quality product in the market at first. However, if the new product which is lower (higher) quality appears, should the monopolistc firm simultaneously produce two different quality products or only let the entrant produce the new one? We compare the individual incentives and find no matter what the new product’s quality is, the entrant always has the higher incentive to produce it. Ya-po Yang Shih-jye Wu 楊雅博 吳世傑 2016 學位論文 ; thesis 59 zh-TW
collection NDLTD
language zh-TW
format Others
sources NDLTD
description 碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 104 === This paper contains two topics. One is the optimal location, the other is quality position of firms. One of the topics extends Barbell model which has the same size’s markets at the end of a straight line’s both side. There are n_A and n_B retailers respectively located on the both side, having to buy the product form the wholesaler then sell to the customers. Additionally, retailers would absorb the transport cost and fixed cost. We discuss how the numbers of retailers affect the wholesaler’s location and after the free entry happened. Given n_A = n_B = n condition, under the uniform pricing, we derive the optimal location would move from any place to 1/2 when the numbers of retailers increase gradually. Under the discriminatory pricing, the optimal location would move from the end of both side to any place when the numbers of retailers increase gradually. Furthermore, the social welfare and total output may higher under the discrimination depend on the numbers of retailers. Then we allow the outside retailers to entry the markets, simply get the familiar results with above. The other topic is we assume that there is a monopolist producing the higher (lower) quality product in the market at first. However, if the new product which is lower (higher) quality appears, should the monopolistc firm simultaneously produce two different quality products or only let the entrant produce the new one? We compare the individual incentives and find no matter what the new product’s quality is, the entrant always has the higher incentive to produce it.
author2 Ya-po Yang
author_facet Ya-po Yang
Wen-cheng Lin
林文丞
author Wen-cheng Lin
林文丞
spellingShingle Wen-cheng Lin
林文丞
Oligopolistic competition in heterogeneous goods market: optimal location and quality position of firms
author_sort Wen-cheng Lin
title Oligopolistic competition in heterogeneous goods market: optimal location and quality position of firms
title_short Oligopolistic competition in heterogeneous goods market: optimal location and quality position of firms
title_full Oligopolistic competition in heterogeneous goods market: optimal location and quality position of firms
title_fullStr Oligopolistic competition in heterogeneous goods market: optimal location and quality position of firms
title_full_unstemmed Oligopolistic competition in heterogeneous goods market: optimal location and quality position of firms
title_sort oligopolistic competition in heterogeneous goods market: optimal location and quality position of firms
publishDate 2016
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/qkcx4s
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