經理人管理績效與資訊揭露程度之研究－以台灣電子產業為例

• Main Authors: Min-Chuan Wu, 吳敏全
• Other Authors: Ying-Hsing Lin
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2016
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/38554204860173803618

碩士 === 國立高雄第一科技大學 === 會計資訊研究所 === 104 === Information Asymmetry resulted from firm management’s ill governance has been the case of many major financial scandals that took place at home and abroad. However, information disclosure will help to reduce the level of Information Asymmetry and strengthening enhances the integrity of Securities market. Since, senior managers held profession resources for disclosure. This study investigates and discusses the influence of Executive Compensation and management performance toward the level of Information Disclosure from Agency Relationship’s point of view. This study results show the Positive Analysis of Executive Compensation, Return on Assets (ROA) and stock price of Taiwan’s Electronics Industry from 2006 to 2010. This study adopts Ordinary Least Square regression model. The control variables are Leverage and company size. The empirical result shows that Executive Compensation, Return on Assets (ROA) and Stock Price all indicate positive correlation to the level of Information Disclosure. It means that when Executive Compensation and corporate performance increase, the level of Information Disclosure will also increase. This study shows rising payment for manager will increase the the level of Information Disclosure and hence it can be a reference for Board of Directors. It is also a good reference for government to encourage poor-performed firms to improve the level of executive compensation for Better Information Disclosure.