A Capacity Reservation Contract under Quantity Dependent Prices in Spot Market

• Main Authors: Yi-Cheng Ke, 柯奕丞
• Other Authors: Yu-Wen Huang
• Format: Others
• Published: 2016
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/06498020529027399548

碩士 === 國立東華大學 === 運籌管理研究所 === 104 === Recent years have witnessed accelerating changes in the economic infrastructure. As a result of that, nexuses and collaborations across supply chains have gotten more and more elaborate. With the expansion of supply chains, management on the supply end of supply-demand equation has become more and more crucial. This tendency has be brought to numerous corporations’ attention and scholars have been trying their utmost developing updated models in reaction to the change in the economic climate. A supplier’s ultimate goal is to maximize his/her revenue, and better still, to create a win-win situation. With key concept such as Spot Market, the present author intends to examine how having interests mutually shared may impact the overall supply chains with one supplier and one retailer as an example. The essay examines Newsvendor model, in particular reserve capacity a retailer obtains from a supplier via the money set aside for that purpose and purchase of getting into a Spot Market, with a retailer having the final say and Newsvendor Model as a base. Before a sales season starts, owing to the uncertainty of the market demand, a retailer tends to negotiate with a supplier to reserve costs that may help maintain its capacity. With this bracketed capacity, as soon as the sales season begins and demands show, the retailer places orders with the supplier. If the actual market demand exceeds the productive capacity, in order to avoid supply shortage, a retailer may turn to a Spot Market for restock to meet the expected interest. 　Meaning to maximize its interest, with the assumption that the two camps do not hold on any information from the other, a retailer may share interests with the supplier with the hope to minimize the cost and risk that the reserved cost may cause. In this paper, a Spot Market provides 3 decision-making models. The first one is where the Spot Market price is fixed and the retailer makes the final decision of whether it wants to place an order or not after the retailer puts the Spot Market price side by side with the cost of remaining out of stock. The other 2 decision models are the Spot Market price fluctuating along with amount ordered with the price going up with the increase of the order; the increase may fall into these two categories: marginal and average. Through in-depth data analysis, the present author intends to figure out the best reserve capacity for both a retailer and supplier on a supply chain. We may find out the best reserved amount for the supply chains and then, with the 3 models above, identify the best interest in a Spot Market. 　　 The research results show that the retailer prefers to pay for a lower productive capacity reserved price and higher retailer price while the supplier is the other way round, where the supplier may lower its productive capacity reserved cost and risks by asking for a higher productive capacity reserved price.