Managerial compensation Sensitivity and Firm Innovation

• Main Authors: Shiu,Hao-Wen, 許浩聞
• Other Authors: Hsueh,Ming-Hsien
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2016
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/ntcaq6

碩士 === 國立彰化師範大學 === 會計學系 === 104 === This paper is to examine whether CEO pay-performance sensitivities affect firm innovation. Patent acquiring activities are playing an important role for firm innovation now a day. In-house patenting activities and patent acquiring, however, bring different operation risk, financing needs, and economic consequences. Different CEO pay-performance sensitivities will affect the CEOs’ risk preference for innovation strategies. By investigating S&P 500 firms from 1980-2012, we find that that if firms have high CEO pay-performance sensitivity to stock, they will hesitate to invest in-house patenting activities. However, if firms have high CEO pay-performance sensitivity to option, they are willing to take downside risk from the innovation activities.