Who Ate the Pork?The Relation between Political Donations and Government Grants

碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 財務金融研究所碩士在職專班 === 104 === Political investment is one of the approaches used by enterprises to develop state-business networks. Among political investment targets, political donations are the most cost-effective form of investment. In recent years, government grants to the private...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Hsing-ChuWang, 王杏竹
Other Authors: Hsuan-Chu Lin
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2016
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/72852382908348625651
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Summary:碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 財務金融研究所碩士在職專班 === 104 === Political investment is one of the approaches used by enterprises to develop state-business networks. Among political investment targets, political donations are the most cost-effective form of investment. In recent years, government grants to the private sector and individuals have surpassed NTD 50 billion, and the total continues to rise year-on-year. This begs the question of whether or not political donations from enterprises or interest groups affect governments’ allocation of grants. Using Taiwan-based listed, over-the-counter (OTC), and emerging companies which made political donations and received government grants between 2011 and 2014 as research samples, this study examines if enterprises’ political donations have a significant influence on their receiving government grants, by probing into the aspects of the making of donations, the amount, and the receivers of political donations. It is discovered that the making, the amount, and the receivers of political donations have a limited influence on enterprises’ receiving government grants; in fact, a negative correlation is indicated. Besides, beneficiaries of government grants are still mostly companies from well-established or specific industries, and the amount of their research and development expenditures does not directly reflect the grants they receive. Moreover, the amount of government grants increased significantly a year before and after an election year, showing that in seeking reelection and fulfilling campaign promises, the ruling party would manipulate all sorts of policy tools to satisfy or reward the electorate.