| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 會計學系 === 104 === Based on ownership structures, this study investigates the effects of type I and type II agency problem on R&D expenses for innovation investments. This study classifies both pyramid ownership structure and cross-holding ownership structure as ownership-concentrated structure while others ownership-dispersed structure.
The empirical results indicate that under ownership-dispersed structure, the reduction in type I agency problems increases research and development (R&D) expenses in innovation investments. The ways that reduce type I agency problem and boost innovation investments include CEO duality, executive ownership, corporate ownership, block ownership, institutional ownership, and the percentage of board seats held by independent directors. Under the case of ownership-concentrated structure, reduction in type II agency problems lead to increase in R&D expenses for innovation investments.
Moreover, comparing with ownership dispersed firms, the ownership concentrated firms spend more in R&D expenses. However, if the dispersed ownership firms can decrease type I agency problems then they spend more in R&D relative to the ownership concentrated firms. By the same token, comparing with ownership-dispersed firms, the reduction in type II agency problems of ownership-concentrated firms will more effectively increase R&D expenses to raise the company value.
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