The Effects of Shareholders’ Value of Acquiring Companies on Hostile Takeover Defenses

• Main Authors: Cheng, I Chun, 鄭亦珺
• Other Authors: Hsu, Chung Yuan
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2016
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/95452329865607964390

碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 會計學系 === 104 === The trend of Merger and Acquisition is booming as of 20th century and the pattern has become variable and complicated. In this study, hostile takeover, one of the focal point on the subject of M&A, is to be discussed. Samples are collected from 2000 to 2015 globally by SDC platinum. Result shows that hostile takeover activity does not benefit shareholders’ interest of the acquiring firm. If the target firm adopts defensive tactics, situation will be worse. Therefore, as the bidding firm, it has to considered whether there are defensive tactics against hostile takeover in the target. While these aren’t significant result. Furthermore, this paper attempts to find the factors which would affect shareholders’ abnormal return under hostile takeover, and result shows M&A premium significantly does. The higher of M&A premium, the more unfavorable to the shareholders’ interest of the acquiring firm. It supports the theory of “winner’s curse”. That is, as M&A premium increases, shareholders’ wealth of the acquiring company is expected to transfer to the targets more which is adverse to the shareholders of the acquiring one.