| Summary: | 碩士 === 逢甲大學 === 財稅學系 === 104 === The issue of corporate governance in China is examined in this article. The article examines several important governance mechanisms for China’s A-share listed companies. The variables include measures of board’s characteristics, managerial incentives, and independent director institution. Using samples are consisted of the listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the period of 2003 to 2013. After deleting corporations with missing data, the final sample is 3,186 firm-years.
The determinants of this empirical model in this study refers to prior literature such as firm size, leverage, ROA, capital intensity and inventory intensity . Moreover, we also examine the Corporate Governance and ETRs whether have related.
The results show that firm size and stock density measure regardless of the manner in which the positive changes are presented, the proportion of large shareholders in the next ETR4 positive change in the presentation; the degree of R & D investment, capital intensity compared to negative changes, the proportion of directors did not receive remuneration in ETR3 change in a negative direction, as the debt ratio, the proportion of shareholding of the Board, the proportion of shareholding managers, the proportion of independent directors, the proportion of state-controlled, the number of meetings, the independent directors allowance, not a case of two posts set explanatory power.
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