| Summary: | 碩士 === 法鼓文理學院 === 佛教學系 === 104 === Dignāga’s Buddhist Logic (yinming), which was developed in Indian and brought to China by Xuanzang(600－664), had once flourished in Tang Dynasty but declined later. There was some trace of revival during the late Ming Dynasty, but it has not received any serious study over the remaining part of the Chinese Buddhist history until 1980’s when scholars from the Chinese Academy of Social Science attempted to study it. Since then, a group of Chinese scholars have studied and publish on Dignāga’s Buddhist Logic. So far, these scholars have been debating on two important questions, namely, " Whether Dignāga’s syllogisms is analogy, inductive or deductive?" and " Is it possible to see Xuanzang’s “Inference for Consciousness-only (vijñaptimātratā)” as a “universal inference (共比量)” accepted by both the proponent and opponent?" In this thesis, I am going to deal with these subjects and come up with solution to them.
Firstly, to solve the argument, "should an example-body (喻體) exclude the inferential subject (Skt. dharmin) (除宗有法) ?", I convert Tri-avayava (三支) back into Pañcāvayava (五支) in which upanaya (合支) and dṛṣṭānta (喻支) are included in the dṛṣṭānta (喻支) of Tri-avayava. Zheng Weihong claims that dṛṣṭānta (喻體) and udāharaṇa (喻依) should exclude the dharmain, which is based on the dṛṣṭānta agreed by both the proponent and opponent (立敵共許). But Yao Nanqiang and a few other scholars claim that dṛṣṭānta should not exclude the dharmin, which is to prove the thesis. Dignāga merged dṛṣṭānta and upanaya of Pañcāvayava into the dṛṣṭānta of Tri-avayava. Therefore, both Yao Nanqiang and Zheng Weihong insist their arguments without settlement. I think that there is a way to reconcile their dilemma by restoring dṛṣṭānta (喻支) in Tri-avayava back to upanaya (合支) and dṛṣṭānta (喻支) in Pañcāvayava. I, thereby, hold that Dignāga''s Tri-avayava is a deductive inference as long as we understand the dṛṣṭānta of Tri-avayava including dṛṣṭānta and upanaya of Pañcāvayava and dṛṣṭānta need not exclude the dharmin.
Next I deal with Xuanzang''s celebrated inference, which he himself proposed to defend the “consciousness-only” doctrine, the inference known as “true consciousness-only pramāṇa 真唯識量”. The debate in the history of Chinese Buddhist logic as well as of the contemporary scholars is simply that whether Xuanzang’s “consciousness-only inference” is or is not a universal inference accepted by both the proponent and opponent. In my view, the “qualification簡別” Xuanzang employed in his example-body喻體 makes the whole inference a self-granted inference rather than a universal inference. Although the two Chinese scholars I took issue with have put forward the same argument, but for a reason very different from mine, and in my view, untenable.
Lately, this thesis deals with Eli Franco''s endorsement of Wonhyo’s rejection of Xuanzang’s “inference”. Franco regards Wonhyo’s rebuttal as a valid inference, which successfully employs the same “qualification” strategy Xuanzang himself used to establish his. However, I found Franco’s argument not tenable because of his misinterpretation of the logical fallacy known as viruddhāvyabhicārin (相違決定量).
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