| Summary: | 博士 === 國立雲林科技大學 === 會計系 === 103 === Herding behavior is one of the focal topics in finance and accounting in the last decades. A number of theories have been developed to explain the reasons behind herding behavior. In this paper, we introduce a new variable: information ambiguity into the reputation-oriented model to analyze the behavior tendency of financial analysts. Then we take the sequence of movement into consideration, to examine the relationship between the sequence of movement and the existence of overconfidence. We find that the most important factor affecting financial analysts’ herding (anti-herding) behavior is the wage labor market offers to the sole winner. When the analyst values his reputation more than the outcome of his recommendation, his anti-herding propensity is positively related to the wage labor market offers to the sole winner and the level of information ambiguity, but negatively related to the initial reputation of the analyst. As to the sequence of movement, we find that the analyst who takes action first exhibits overconfidence. The relationship between the level of reputation and the incentives coming from overconfidence is confounding. This paper provides a solid theory for related empirical studies. Adding information ambiguity into the model helps to elevate our understanding of the behavior of analysts.
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