Whether CEOs Rearrange their Compensation Incentives via M&A Complexity

• Main Authors: Wei Lin, 林瑋
• Other Authors: Chih-Liang Liu
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2015
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/68601257903083003808

碩士 === 國立雲林科技大學 === 財務金融系 === 103 === Using the M&A events from the U.S. listed company as sample from 2007 to 2009, this paper explores the effects of the level of M&A complexity, including relative size of merger and target firm, foreign M&A, dealing periods, and changes of stock return between Pre- and post-acquisition, on CEO compensation structure. The empirical evidence shows that during credit crisis periods, the level of M&A complexity is reflected on CEO cash compensation, instead of equity- or debt-based compensation. Therefore, this research argues that cash compensation provide incentives for CEO to invest in highly complex M&A deals.