What Is the Requirement for a Creature to Perceive the World Objectively?

• Main Authors: Hao Pang, 龐皓
• Other Authors: Aleksandra Mroczko-Wąsowicz
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2015
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/66642276097314088675

碩士 === 國立陽明大學 === 心智哲學研究所 === 103 === My aim in this work is to discuss the requirements that must be fulfilled in order to acquire the objective representation, which is, to represent the physical world accurately. I analyze two different approaches toward the objectivity. The first approach is the statement that the objective representation requires cognitive abilities. Both Quine and Davidson argue that the additional cognitive ability, especially, the linguistic ability, is necessary for objective representation. Quine asserts that the language provides a framework which makes the perceptual information become categorized and the categorized information is the beginning of objectivity. Davidson believes that the objectivity starts from intersubjectivity. He argues that when two subjects can check the information with each other, they are able to represent the reality from the appearance. The linguistic ability is required for people to share information with each other. On the contrary, according to the second approach, represented by Tyler Burge, perceptual systems can represent the world objectively without involving any additional cognitive abilities. Burge considers perception as objective. One support for this position comes from the position of anti-individualism. The anti-individualist insists that the nature of mental state is dependent on the environment-individual relations. According to anti-individualism, perceptual representations involve objective aspects. The other support comes from the empirical research on perception. The infant and animal studies indicate that infants and some animals exhibit the ability of objectivity even if they do not have linguistic ability. I propose that Burge’s theory is superior to Quine’s and Davidson’s theories. However, in the end, I indicate that the cases suggesting that perception is cognitively penetrable might be counterexamples to Burge’s theory. I argue that there are two different ways to represent a physical entity, which are, to represent the existence and to represent the appearance. I think that Burge’s theory is correct only when we limit our discussion to how the creature represents the existence, but not how the creature represents the appearance.