A Novel Key Management Scheme based on SKMaS in wireless sensor networks

• Main Authors: FENG-CHING CHIANG, 江豐慶
• Other Authors: Fang-Yie Leu
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2015
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/53089757472577212927

碩士 === 東海大學 === 資訊工程學系 === 103 === In this paper we propose a symmetric cryptographic approach, named the Novel Key Management Scheme (NKMaS for short), in which a sensor node, called the Key Distribution Server (KDS for short), is responsible for the key management of the NKMaS. When the system starts up, the KDS establishes a key matrix K of n×n, and sends its control key K_0,0, its individual key K_1,1, key-cross i and key-table i in which key-cross i as a part of K contains the communication keys (CKs for short) with which node i can communicate with node j, 2≤j≤n,j≠i, and key-cross i 4×4 table used to generate CKs. With node IDs, two arbitrary valid sensor nodes, e.g., i and j, can individually identify the corresponding CKs, i.e., k_(i,j) and k_(j,i), in their own key-crosses with which to derive a dynamic shared key (DSK) for encrypting/decrypting messages transmitted between them. When i leaves the underlying network, the corresponding CKs and the individually keys currently utilized by i can be reused by a newly joining sensor, e.g., h. However, when h joins the network, if no such previously-used IDs are available, h will be given a new ID, i.e., n+1, key-cross h, K_0,0, K_1,1 and key-table h by the KDS. The KDS sends a newly-joining message which contains two seeds with which node i can generate K_(i,n+1) and K_(n+1,i), to i,2≤i≤n, i≠h. With K_(i,n+1) and K_(n+1,i), i can communicate with h. The lemmas and security analyzed in this paper prove that the proposed system can protect at least three common attacks, Eavesdropping attack、Forgery KDS attack and Forgery sensor node attack.