The Impact of R&D Expenditure Deletion on the Relationship between Top Management Power and Excessive Compensation.
碩士 === 東海大學 === 會計學系 === 103 === This study examines the effects of top management power (CEO shareholdings, the proportions of top management served by family members and CEO duality) and institutional ownerships on excessive executive compensation when firms reduce R&D expenditure. Using Taiwa...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | zh-TW |
| Published: |
2015
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/82954735823177582508 |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 東海大學 === 會計學系 === 103 === This study examines the effects of top management power (CEO shareholdings, the proportions of top management served by family members and CEO duality) and institutional ownerships on excessive executive compensation when firms reduce R&D expenditure. Using Taiwan’s listed companies from 2008 to 2012 as research sample, this study shows the following empirical results: (1) CEO shareholdings have a significant positive relationship with excessive executive compensation. (2) The proportions of top management served by family members have a significant negative relationship with excessive executive compensation. (3) CEO duality significantly increases excessive executive compensation. (4) The institutional ownerships, especially domestic institutional ownerships, can significantly reduce excessive compensation of top management.
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