Research on the Strategy of Xi Jin-ping’s Consolidating His Grip on Military Power after Taking Office

• Main Authors: WANG,YOU-NIEN, 王佑年
• Other Authors: FAN,SHI-PING
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2015
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/38251246817853433333

碩士 === 國防大學政治作戰學院 === 政治研究所 === 103 === In the CCP authoritarian government, the leaders of the regime must have sufficient support as a foundation for stability. Among them, the support from the troops is a crucial one. Therefore, all leaders in the CCP take "the Party commands the gun" as the supreme principle to ensure that they will not be toppled during political struggles. Xi Jin-ping became the fifth-generation, three-in-one national leader at the 18th Party Congress with Hu's complete retirement. Xi’s concentration of power is higher than the two former leaders Jiang Ze-min and Hu Jin-tao. After taking office, Xi Jin-ping proposed the long-term vision of the China Dream and the dream of a strong military and vigorously promoted the campaign of reform and anti-corruption in the army. Through the setting up of various reform groups, he established his own command structure with his advantage of military background and won a higher degree of support from the army, assimilating into the military quickly and consolidating his grip on power. Using the approaches of document analysis and cultural studies, this paper examines Xi Jin-ping's measures aimed at controlling the army and his degree of success and difficulties along the way after he became the national leader. This paper also tries to understand the static and dynamic conditions for PRC leaders to command their troops, the role the PLA plays and the stance it takes during the process of power transfer, by studying the strategies for PRC leaders to get a grip on military power. Keywords: party-military relations, military power, control of the military