Internal Corporate Governance and Operating Performance – The Cases of Mergers

碩士 === 中國文化大學 === 財務金融學系 === 103 === The mergers and acquisitions activities of global companies increase a lot frequently. The purpose of mergers and acquisitions are expected to generate operating synergies and to enhance the company’s operating efficiency, and thus to increase the value of the co...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Yen, Chen-ting, 顏禎葶
Other Authors: Yang, Fu-ju
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2015
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/78452953522203087267
Description
Summary:碩士 === 中國文化大學 === 財務金融學系 === 103 === The mergers and acquisitions activities of global companies increase a lot frequently. The purpose of mergers and acquisitions are expected to generate operating synergies and to enhance the company’s operating efficiency, and thus to increase the value of the company. However, not every case of mergers and acquisitions is successful. Merger and acquisitions may fail because of cultural conflicts. Based on previous literature (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009; Yermack, 1996), the good corporate governance can improve the company’s performance. It is hoped that the good corporate governance can also improve the performance of mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, the study investigated the relationship between corporate governance and performance of mergers companies from 2007 to 2013. According to the empirical results of ordinal least squares regression (OLS), the conclusions are as follows. First, the size of independent directors, the duality of CEO and chairman of the board, the compensation of manager, the insider ownership and the government ownership are related financial performance of mergers companies; the size of board, the duality of CEO and chairman of the board and the compensation of manager are related financial performance of non-mergers companies. Second, the size of board, the size of independent directors, the duality of CEO and chairman of the board, the compensation of manager and the insider ownership are related market performance of mergers companies; the size of independent directors and the compensation of manager are related market performance of non-mergers companies.