Whether the Ownership Structures Affect the Business Performance? Panel-type Quantile Regression Analysis

• Main Authors: CHAN,PEI-YING, 詹珮穎
• Other Authors: 王冠閔
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2015
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/xbye64

碩士 === 僑光科技大學 === 財務金融研究所 === 103 === This paper discusses the relationship between the equity structure of Taiwan’s listed (OTC) construction companies and the corporate performance. The data from 2009 to 2013 are used for research, totaling 68 listed (OTC) construction companies, and 1,360 pieces of data. Empirical research is conducted using the panel regression model and quantile panel regression model. The panel regression model shows that: supervisor’s pledge ratio, after verified by model 1 and model 2, has an effect on business performance, and the revenue profit is increased, satisfying that three indicators of business performance share the same standard. Quantile panel regression model is divided into 5 quantiles to interpret the performance. The three indicators of business performance are taken as common standard. The results are as follows: (1) there is a significantly negative correlation when the supervisor’s shareholding ratio (SH3) is 0.25 and 0.5; (2) there is a significantly positive correlation when the director’s pledge ratio (DP4) is 0.5, 0.75; (3) there is a significantly negative correlation when the supervisor’s pledge ratio (SP5) is 0.95; (4) there is a significantly positive correlation when the large shareholders’ shareholding ratio (BL6) is 0.5, 0.75; and (5) there is a significantly positive correlation when the growth return (GR7) is 0.75. after adding the quadratic term; (6) there is a significantly positive correlation when the supervisor’s shareholding ratio (SP9) is 0.25; (7) there is a significantly negative correlation when the director’s pledge (DP10) is 0.5, 0.75; (8) there is a significantly positive correlation when the supervisor’s pledge ratio (SP11) is 0.95; (9) there is a significantly negative correlation when the large shareholders’ shareholding ratio (BL12) is 0.5, 0.75; and (10) there is a significantly negative correlation when the growth return (GR13) is 0.75.