| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 103 === In 2014, the matching result of Taiwan’s high school admission system had been controversial. Some good schools didn’t receive enough application from students, and some good students didn’t receive offers from schools. This paper is based on the college admission problem theorem of Gale and Shapley (1962), trying to find the reasons of the inefficient result of Taiwan’s high school admission system and provide some specific recommendations. The result shows that Taiwan’s high school admission system in 2014 would generate unstable matching result, and give both the schools and the students incentives to lie on their preference list, resulting in the inefficient result. Due to the problems above, we provide five recommendations of policy: (a) Combine the Exam-Free Admission and the Special Examination Admissions’ preference lists, with the preference list of the Special Examination Admissions pre-announced. (b) Cancel the limit of preference lists. (c) Remove the preference score from the Examinations-Free Entrance Competition. (d) Change the deferred-acceptance procedure from school-proposing to student-proposing. (e) Allow different schools to have different Examinations-Free Entrance Competition.
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