| Summary: | 博士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 哲學研究所 === 103 === The question “Why be moral?” has long been a debate in moral philosophy. Skeptics have attempted to undermine the foundation of morality by arguing that morality cannot be reconciled with self-interests, and that the solidity of morality is jeopardized by luck. I contend that their first challenge is well held. Nevertheless, if we look deeper into the understanding of what kind of normative beings we are, we will find that the solidest ground of why being moral just lies within our intention to be good. To argue for this position, I develop a psychological model of moral judgment. As the model shows, the intention of the agent justifies being moral both in introspection and social interaction. On introspecting, agents take their intentions to be the decisive factor in prompting their actions. And on social interacting, people are inculcated to praise or to blame others’ deeds by identifying their intentions within the cultural contexts. Moral norms are thus done and abided not as alien things but as our nature. Appreciating intentions in this way, I shall conclude that we can confidently ward off skeptics’ challenges on why being moral.
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