The Interpretation of Juridical Acts: Theory and Practice --Focusing on the Interpretation of Contracts

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 法律學研究所 === 103 === This thesis is a study on the Methodology of the interpretation of juridical acts, which mainly focuses on the interpretation of contracts, and aims to present a complete study combining theory and practice. “Legal interpretation” and “the interpretation of j...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Chi-Lu Li, 李其陸
Other Authors: Chung-Jau Wu
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2015
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/vy5k5z
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 法律學研究所 === 103 === This thesis is a study on the Methodology of the interpretation of juridical acts, which mainly focuses on the interpretation of contracts, and aims to present a complete study combining theory and practice. “Legal interpretation” and “the interpretation of juridical acts” are both important acts of interpretation in jurisprudence. I consider that, with moderate adjustment, the method of legeal interpretation can also be applied to interpret juridical acts. The interpretation of juridical acts is defined in article 98 of Civil Code (Taiwan) and this can be traced back to article 133 and 157 of German Civil Code. In my opinion, when interpreting a declaration of intention, the courts should apply an objective and normative approach, whether there is a recipient or not. That is, the courts should discover the meaning which a reasonable person should understand after taking all the relevant circumstances into account. Though there is no stable rank between different elements(criterion) of interpretation, if the purpose of the contract can be deduced from the circumstances, the meaning which accords with the contractual purpose most should take priority. As to the contractual gap filling, relevant theories in Germany are worth considering. With regard to the practice of our supreme courts, many courts have recognized the necessity of objective-normative interpretation. Nevertheless, most of the courts still neglect to take all the relevant circumstances into consideration. Besides, several courts accorded to the precedent No. 1118 (Supreme Court, 1928) and thus took the literal meaning of the expressions as the only criterion. Moreover, most of the courts have not learned the concept of contractual gap. Even though they had learned about it, the method of gap filling is still insufficient. Consequently, there is still a lot to improve.