| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 法律學研究所 === 103 === This Thesis analyzes the evolution of reasoning about E.U. democracy, protection of fundamental rights and sovereignty that the German Federal Constitutional Court(FCC) has been shaping starting with the EWG-Verordnungen(1967) and culminating with the Lisbon Treaty case(2009). The FCC’s reasoning has often taken the form of caveats, whereby the FCC “warned” the European Union of its assessments of the state of democracy in the Union as well as the acts of E.U. shall not exceed its own competence, which is derived from its member-states.
This Thesis argues that the FCC’s view of the primary source of the Union’s democratic legitimacy has gradually shifted away from the European towards the German Parliament (Bundestag and Bundesrat). Never before has the FCC highlighted the role of national parliaments in buttressing E.U. democracy with such clarity. As a result, the decisions of the FCC can be classified into three periods: (I) The Beginning: when FCC mainly focused on the protection of fundamental rights; (II) The Middle: in this period, the FCC started facing the problem of democratic deficit. Then, (III) the Ongoing: the FCC ruled that as long as the European Union is an association of sovereign states, two consequences ensue: (a) the democratic legitimacy provided by national parliaments and governments, and complemented by the European Parliament, is sufficient; and (b) E.U. democracy cannot and need not be shaped in analogy to that of a state. As a corollary, the German system of parliamentary involvement in E.U. affairs has significantly been overhauled to enhance the legal position of the German Parliament vis-à-vis the Federal Government.
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