| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立東華大學 === 國際企業學系 === 103 === This thesis mainly explores the decision making of the optimal timing analysis for both high- and low-priced properties of two hotel groups which are assessing hotel investments in an emerging tourist area. In the case of business information transparency, both hotel groups know that the other has chosen the same target market to invest the hotel expansion. We discuss three different contexts in this thesis: in the first, a high-priced hotel plays the role of leader and a low-priced hotel plays the role of follower; in the second, a low-priced hotel plays the role of leader and a high-priced hotel plays the role of follower, and at last both the high- and low-priced hotels invest into the same emerging market at the same time. According to game options, the leader and follower create three game models in which the number of visitors obeys the geometric Brownian motion and create formulae by using value matching and smooth pasting conditions. Accordingly, we are able to identify the optimal timing for two hotel groups to expand into the emerging market in all of the three contexts. The results suggest that when competing hotel groups are entering the same market and facing the situations that discussed in this thesis, decision-makers should make the decision to expand at the optimal time.
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