Agency Problem and Real Earnings Management

• Main Authors: XU,XIAO-YI, 徐筱懿
• Other Authors: CHEN,YU-RU
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/36284646066699745322

碩士 === 國立彰化師範大學 === 財務金融技術學系 === 103 === The goal of this research is to discuss company's agency problems concerning the influence on real earnings management. There are traditional agency problem and core agency problem in company,This study obtains sample companies from year 2004 to 2012 in Taiwan,This paper discuss the influence of agency problem on real earnings management. Our results show that the company with family members serve as managers will be not utilize the real earnings management,and the higher percentage of the management ownership will be not utilize the real earnings management. The company with board seat-control with deviation of control form voting rights are more likely to utilize real earnings management,and the voting right with deviation of control form cash flow rights are more likely to utilize real earnings management.