The association between Agency Cost and the Turnover of Internal Audit Manager

碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 財務金融研究所碩士在職專班 === 103 === SUMMARY This paper is examines the relation between agency costs and the turnover of internal audit manager (henceforth IAM), and further explore whether firm attributes, such as managerial ownership, and dual chairman/CEO structure, external audit firm sw...

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Main Authors: Yu-PingLin, 林玉萍
Other Authors: Yu-Chen Lin
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2015
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/85730048167896540722
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spelling ndltd-TW-103NCKU53040572016-08-15T04:17:47Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/85730048167896540722 The association between Agency Cost and the Turnover of Internal Audit Manager 代理成本與內部稽核主管異動關係之探討 Yu-PingLin 林玉萍 碩士 國立成功大學 財務金融研究所碩士在職專班 103 SUMMARY This paper is examines the relation between agency costs and the turnover of internal audit manager (henceforth IAM), and further explore whether firm attributes, such as managerial ownership, and dual chairman/CEO structure, external audit firm switching, influence that relationship. In reference to Singh and Davidson Ⅲ(2003) and Ang, Cole and Lin(2000), this paper use the operating expense ratio and asset turnover ratio as the proxies for agency costs. By using Logit regression analysis, this study finds that the turnover of IAM is not only significantly correlation with agency costs but also managerial ownership. Furthermore the results show that the corporate governance factors, like external audit firm switch and turnover of the mangers, are positively associated with IAM turnover. Keyword: agency theory, agency cost, internal audit, turnover of internal audit manager, corporate governance Yu-Chen Lin 林囿成 2015 學位論文 ; thesis 56 zh-TW
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language zh-TW
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sources NDLTD
description 碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 財務金融研究所碩士在職專班 === 103 === SUMMARY This paper is examines the relation between agency costs and the turnover of internal audit manager (henceforth IAM), and further explore whether firm attributes, such as managerial ownership, and dual chairman/CEO structure, external audit firm switching, influence that relationship. In reference to Singh and Davidson Ⅲ(2003) and Ang, Cole and Lin(2000), this paper use the operating expense ratio and asset turnover ratio as the proxies for agency costs. By using Logit regression analysis, this study finds that the turnover of IAM is not only significantly correlation with agency costs but also managerial ownership. Furthermore the results show that the corporate governance factors, like external audit firm switch and turnover of the mangers, are positively associated with IAM turnover. Keyword: agency theory, agency cost, internal audit, turnover of internal audit manager, corporate governance
author2 Yu-Chen Lin
author_facet Yu-Chen Lin
Yu-PingLin
林玉萍
author Yu-PingLin
林玉萍
spellingShingle Yu-PingLin
林玉萍
The association between Agency Cost and the Turnover of Internal Audit Manager
author_sort Yu-PingLin
title The association between Agency Cost and the Turnover of Internal Audit Manager
title_short The association between Agency Cost and the Turnover of Internal Audit Manager
title_full The association between Agency Cost and the Turnover of Internal Audit Manager
title_fullStr The association between Agency Cost and the Turnover of Internal Audit Manager
title_full_unstemmed The association between Agency Cost and the Turnover of Internal Audit Manager
title_sort association between agency cost and the turnover of internal audit manager
publishDate 2015
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/85730048167896540722
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