Co-opetition relationship between agent and principal: Case study of industrial analyzer in Taiwan

• Main Authors: Wu, Chen Hu, 吳成湖
• Other Authors: Huang, Sy Ming
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/ustw6a

碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 經營管理碩士學程(EMBA) === 103 === Generally speaking, the fate of the sales agent and the OEM agent are similar in someway, however their relationships with the principals are quite different from each other, especially when it refers to the industrial analyzer business. It will be a kind of co-opetition relationship between agent and principal while the agent or the principal has the capacity of system integration. This study, taking a local Taiwanese company which represents multi foreigner analyzer brands and is capable of system integration, as an example, attempts to figure out the relationship between agent and principal and then develops the dominant strategies of each parties through the case study and the game theory analyzing.  The dominant strategy of agent: enforcing the principal to cooperate by competition, therefore the cooperation contains competing. 1. To strengthen the agent’s corporate image to the customers by bundling the value-added products while selling principals’ products. This is to prevent the principal to replace the agent easily while they want to change the agent or set up the local branch. 2. Agent must always have alternative products as back up, especially for the major income products. 3. A compatible principal is the optima choice, not the best one.  The dominant strategy of the principal: inhibiting the competition by empowering themselves, therefore threating the agent to obey or die. Never allow tail wagging the dog. From this study, it shows the relationship between agent and principal is sort of dynamic “co-opetition” relationship and the existing percentages of “cooperation” and “competition” are varied in time, games, environment, …etc., instead of static one.