| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立高雄應用科技大學 === 財富與稅務管理系碩士在職專班 === 103 === The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of the collateralized shares on holding conference calls, and further examine whether the collateralized shares levels influence the corporate discourse informativeness, and turnover.
This study contains 6,135 valid samples listed Taiwan from 2009 to 2013. The empirical results find that the directors and supervisors pursue their own interests to expropriate shareholders and are unwilling to deal with external agency problem between the company and outside investors or creditors when the collateralized shares are higher. So, they are prone to hold fewer conference calls. Moreover, the higher the collateralized shares, the greater deviation the directors and supervisors ownership is. The directors and supervisors will have more intension to expropriate shareholders and disclosure less information relative to their company. The corporate conference calls with higher collateralized shares have poor disclosure informativeness and have less effect to improve the external information asymmetry problem and turnover.
|
|---|
