The Relationship Between Executive Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity–Evidence from China
碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 金融與國際企業學系金融碩士班 === 103 === In this study we investigate the relation between pay-performance sensitivity and investment-cash flow Sensitivity of 2,408 listed firms in China during 2005-2014. We also examine the differences in such relationship betweenState-owned and Non- State-owned...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | zh-TW |
| Published: |
2015
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16411356941795118752 |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 金融與國際企業學系金融碩士班 === 103 === In this study we investigate the relation between pay-performance sensitivity and investment-cash flow Sensitivity of 2,408 listed firms in China during 2005-2014. We also examine the differences in such relationship betweenState-owned and Non- State-owned enterprises.
The proxies for pay-performance sensitivity are salary pay-performance Sensitivity and incentive pay-performance sensitivity. Incentive pay includes stock and stock options that company's CEO received by the end of each year.
We find that pay-performance sensitivityattenuate the relationship between investment and cash flow sensitivity under the condition that company's free cash flow greater than 0. Such relation is more significant in non-state-owned firms than in State-owned firms, implying that the latter are more poorly governed than the former.
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