| Summary: | 碩士 === 逢甲大學 === 公共政策研究所 === 103 === On September 6, 2007, Israel conducted an air raid on Syria. It is widely believed that the suspicious cooperation of nuclear weapon development between Syria and North Korea is the main cause to trigger the air raid and in turn all the International media focused on the air raid itself. However, the thesis argues that the story behind the air raid is more significant and the air raid demonstrates an excellent example for Republic of China (Taiwan) to learn that a small state has its ability to successfully lunch a war against a relatively bigger state.
The air raid is obviously a kind of typical information operation. This operation itself is an excellent demonstration of the classic, Art of War, “making the adversary exposed and vulnerable to me.”
As the Syrian Armed Forces back in 2007 has operated 584MiG series advance fighter jets and 25 air defense brigades (including 150 battallions equipped with numerous types of SAMS), Israel was still able to conduct a successful air-raid on Syria. As Taiwan’s assets of Air Force is the same with (even better than) Israel’s, does Taiwan have the ability to conduct the same air raid by purely utilizing F15I and F16 fighters without any air, maritime, or ground forces supports?
By carefully examining the cases of military confrontations over the past 25 years, it is found that the ability of information strength acquisition and use plays a key role in controlling a battlefield. Thus, the crucial cases of military confrontations since 1991 onwards shows the policy of purchasing military weapons from foreign countries is not enough for Taiwan to maintain its military superiority over mainland China. The imbalance of military force across the Straits has deteriorated heavily.
Hence, the thesis suggests that Taiwan should implement a national defense policy of innovating military weapons by itself in order to take an advantage of information warfare and improve its military power as well as whole national strength.
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