The Impact of Ownership Structcre on Real Earnings Management

• Main Authors: CHANG YUNG-KUANG, 張雍光
• Other Authors: Chuen-Bo Chang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/05071171213937991799

碩士 === 大葉大學 === 管理學院碩士在職專班 === 103 === Investors often take quality of corporate governance as an important reference for investment appraisal. Most of previous studies on real earnings management used accountant items to explore it. This study examines whether a company will adopt real earnings management when incentives of real earnings management generates in a purpose to investigate the relevance between real earnings management and ownership structure. Empirical results show that core agency problem is positively correlated to real earnings management. Deviation of control rights and cash flow rights will affect the value of the company, showing core agency problem indeed decreases the value of a company. Institutional ownership correlated significantly positive with real earnings management. Finally, it is in consistence with former literature on incentive theory that when a company does not have earnings management incentives, these phenomena surely will disappear.