The Relationship between Institutional Directors and Earning Manipulation

• Main Authors: Liu Pei, 劉珮
• Other Authors: Ou, Chin-Shih
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2015
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/w3945n

碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 會計與資訊科技研究所 === 103 === This paper investigates the relationship between the system of institutional directors in the TSEC & OTC listed companies and earning manipulation which follows the suggesting model of Kothari et al. (2005) to estimate the discretionary accruals as a proxy of earning management to。The sample period is from 2004 to 2013 including all listed companies in Taiwan. The final observed values are 12488, to test related hypotheses by multiple regressions. This empirical results shows that the seat proportion of institutional directors, the seat proportion of institutional directors represented the ultimate controlling shareholder, and shareholding ratio of institutional directors are positive to discretionary accruals. It implies that institutional directors can’t restrain earning management. However, there are no relationship between the seat proportion of institutional directors represented the second and third largest shareholder and government agency. In addition, sensitivity tests found that whether the discretionary accruals is absolute or not, the results are resemble. But the institutional directors represented government agency tend to downward earnings manipulation. Our findings have contribution to understand the role of institutional directors in board operations and earnings management to be a reference for authorities of capital market.