Multi-unit Auctions Based on Bidder's Demanding Amounts

• Main Authors: LIAO,HSUAN-YUAN, 廖軒磒
• Other Authors: LEE,SING-LING
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2016
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/3e6xe7

碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 資訊工程研究所 === 104 === We know many of the multi-unit auctions theses are discussions about how many items auctioneers are selling to bidders. In this thesis, we are reversing the facade into how many items are going to be bought from different sellers, each seller has a private value for each units minimum price and a unit limit on sale in the auction. We propose a mechanism for buying all the units and it is two rules are applied, they are decision rule is based on sellers' unit and value to decide whether a seller will be assigned any units and pricing rule is based on sellers' unit to decide the price for buying from each participants unit which they sale. In our designed mechanism, two properties of fairness, Truthfulness and Near Pareto optimality are satisfied. And our algorithm is compared with Greedy algorithm. In our experimental evaluations, our algorithm can prevent seller from lying his value and units for making profit. Keywords: Multi-Unit Auctions, Truthfulness, Near Pareto Optimality