Board incentives and CEO compensations: Evidence from the 1999 Financial Services Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act)

• Main Authors: Jia-Ying Lin, 林佳瑩
• Other Authors: I-Ju Chen
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/7by3m7

碩士 === 元智大學 === 商學碩士班(財務金融學程) === 102 === This study analyzes the relationship between CEO compensation and characteristics of boards of directors. More specifically, we investigate the impact of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act on corporate board structures and changes in compensation. We discover that boards with weak and ineffective monitoring procedures are likely to offer higher compensation to managers during periods of deregulation. One result includes an increase in compensation and effective board operations. However, because we separate the sample into Standard and Poor (S&;P) 1500 and non-S&;P 1500, the significance of test only exists for non-S&;P samples.