Does Insider Shareholding Enhance the Impacts of Financial Performance on Firm Value?

• Main Authors: Chen-Feng Weng, 翁宸鋒
• Other Authors: Yen-Sen Ni
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/38536251938534453690

碩士 === 淡江大學 === 管理科學學系碩士班 === 102 === Due to the agency problem resulting from the separation of ownership and management, the issue of corporate governance becomes more important recently. In this study, we employ the insiders defined by Taiwan authority as our target variables, and then explore whether insiders’ shareholding such as directors’ holding ratio, mangers’ holding ratio, and so on would enhance the impacts of financial performance on firm value. The sample is collected from the firms listed in Taiwan stock exchanges. The study finds the results as shown below. First, the directors pledge ratio negatively affects firm value in all models employed in this study. Second, the firms recruiting independent directors would enhance ROE and ROA on firm value. Finally, foreign directors would enhance ROE on firm value, which indicates that foreign institutions care about ROE.