The Diesel-electric submarines Capability Of China Anti-Access strategies

• Main Authors: Huan-Tung Ma, 馬煥棟
• Other Authors: 曾復生
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/35279572181579167834

碩士 === 淡江大學 === 國際事務與戰略研究所碩士在職專班 === 102 === The 1996 Taiwan crisis, was the effect of a series of missiles tests conducted by the PRC, allegedly intended to intimidate our presidential election. Two U.S. aircraft carriers were deployed in the vicinity and caused the PRC’s deterrence less effective than expected. The so-called “Anti-Access (A2) Strategy” by U.S. think tanks, is the PRC’s strategy in response to U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups’ access in Taiwan Strait in recent years. Although rarely mentioned in PRC’s military academia, it does not mean the nonexistence of the concept and has an implication of preventing the U.S. seizing Taiwan cross Strait. The essence of "Anti-Access strategy" is the thinking of "People''s War", and the "Active defense" strategic guidance. Also, the application of asymmetrical warfare is the basis of reaching the strategic conduct of a weak force against the strong one. The stealth and surprise attack feature adds up the submarine’s strategic value than any other weapons platforms. This can be best proved by observations and studies of World War I,Ⅱ and the Falkland. Besides the tactical application - surveillance and reconnaissance (SR), surprise attack, submarine hunting, fleet and amphibious warfare support, Search and rescue missions and special operations, the strategic application includes maritime shipping sabotage, minefields blockade, seashore attack and strategic deterrence, etc. Therefore, the fully utilization of submarine operational features can have a decisive influence to the battlefield during competing the sea dominance. Diesel submarines play an important role in PRC’s A2 strategy. PRC’s continuously aggressive constructions of diesel submarines lead an expectation, by excellent features, to deter the U.S. force’s attempt of intervention. If the attempt of intervention cannot be shifted, the desire of hindering the U.S. Forces by deploying minimum PRC’s forces and military investment will be the substitute. Based on all the facts, we must have a completely understanding of PRC diesel submarines strength.