Managerial Motivation When Effort Improves Higher Order Risk

• Main Authors: Yen-Lin Huang, 黃彥霖
• Other Authors: Larry Tzeng
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/67178565751442839703

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 財務金融學研究所 === 102 === Managerial motivation has long been an important issue in economy. There are many papers discussing the “optimal contract design” that would optimize the effort spent by managers. However, the “optimal” contract may be affected by several factors and therefore can change over time. The problem “how the managerial motivation would be affected under certain type of contracts” has long been ignored. This article aim to figure out how managerial effort would be affected by the change of the parameters of the contract provided the effort improves higher order risk of production.