A Study on the Budget Block Instead of the Deletion in Budget Review System：Focus on Between 2004 to 2012

• Main Authors: Yen-Yu Lin, 林晏瑜
• Other Authors: 陳顯武
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/tm6798

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 國家發展研究所 === 102 === In recent years, the Legislative Yuan of REpublic of China has had a great power for budget deletion at budgetary process because of political party of rivalry and some mental factors. There is usually” paid after approval” happened at budgetary process in Legislative Yuan. It means that when legislators can threaten Administration Department by Budget Block. The purpose of Budget Block is to replace deletion and then access to intervene budget execution. Besides, it is to meddle in executive power of administrative authority. This research is focused on the analysis of the budget cases between Chen Shui-Bian and Ma Ying-jeou from 2005 to 2012. There are amount of budget deletion, the rate of budge block, the range of annual budget deletion for central government and comparison between two periods of parties in power. Finally, the variation is apparent or not in different parties duration. The conclusion of this research is that Chen Shui-Bian administration is actually with a higher budget deletion rate and budget block than Ma Ying-jeouadministration. Chen Shui-Bian administrationreduced annual input budget wider than annual output budget. Moreover, the rate of budget block is higher than rate of budget deletion.