Interaction Between the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan: An Empirical Analysis of Central Government Budget Review from 2005-2010

• Main Authors: Lee, Ke-Chi, 李克岐
• Other Authors: Luor, Ching-Jyuhn
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/3vf2rp

碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 公共行政暨政策學系 === 102 === The present study aims to delve into different factors depends on empirical approach which affects the executive budget cut by legislators through reviewing several previous studies. It can be known as the political wrestle in benefit allotment between the executive and the legislative during the budget review process. Generally speaking, legislators will "reward" or "punish" the executive budget, to exchange for the allocation policy interests to their own constituency. This situation may lead to a phenomenon that legislators have a strong incentive to cut the executive budget. Based on the negative binominal regression model and OLS regression model, the special focus is put on three factors: "personal traits", "congressional institution", and "election and constituency". These factors are adopted to find out the influences on the budget review process and the cut of the budget. Besides, it is also expected to reveal the factors of "the traits of the executive" and "the traits of the executive head" which may affect whether the budget has been cut or not. First, in the framework one (the legislator as the unit of analysis). The findings show that their personality traits does not play a prominent role in the cut of executive budget. However, the factors of "ruling party" and "leader of the committee members" show highly critical role during the budget review process. In addition, in the election and constituency factors, we found that many diverse factors can be shown to influence legislators’ decision making on cutting budgeted expenditure of executive budget such as, the year of election and the number of interest groups in their own constituency. This may lead the executive budget which cut by the legislator in different levels. In the framework two (the executive as the unit of analysis), we found that the executive have the stronger pork barrel incentive, and is able to attract legislators to cut the executive budget. In addition, we also found the executive with the larger scale and worse performance (that "number" is insignificantly in statistics), the budget has high possibility being cut by the legislator. In the traits of the executive head factors, the only possibility is that "experience of executive head (the other executive head)" plays the important role in the statistics (that "money" is insignificantly in statistics). The finding show that the behavior of legislators during the process budget reviewing, are affected by "congressional institution factors" and "election and constituency factors", especially for the "election and constituency factors". Furthermore, if considered from the perspective of pork barrel incentive, legislators pay more attention to make the budget cut for executive. As a result, these findings imply that legislators allocate the political benefit in their own constituency for re-election.