| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 經濟學系 === 102 === Urban renewal and land expropriation embody essentially the same nature because they both are the ways of altering land use in order to raise the final output. That's way I put them together, trying to discover what kind of property right structures they are and what flaws of the law/rules are going to be.
In this thesis, I pick some representative cases to show what the judges' views are and sum up what kinds of standard they would take when comparing public interest with self interest. Then I simulate the possible ways to reduce the transaction costs to see the following results.
In the chapter of land expropriation, I found that the judges would tend to use circumstantial judgments, which means they admit the way of land use the government enforced is illegal but still can't retract the original action, when they think it's too harmful for the public interest to return the right to exclude to the original land owner. We can tell from these cases that in Taiwan the judges regard the property rights of land as a tie-in package which can't be separated. Then we tried to separate the property rights, leaving the right of use to the government and returning the right of exclude to the original land owner, and let themselves build a leasing relationship for it won't harm the public interest. But it will cost much to do so since the rent is hard to be priced and the land owner may raise the rent someday which the government can't afford then. That's why I think it's better to maintain status quo.
In the chapter of urban renewal, I divide this issue into two parts. At the first part, I discuss whether the Urban Renewal Act fits procedural justice. At the second part, I focus on the role of rights transformation played in the process of urban renewal and find the rules of rights transformation will widen the distrust between land owners and the implementer since (1) the role of land owners is absent in the property price-estimated process, (2) land owners lack relevant information to know whether their property assessments are fairly estimated or not, (3) the implementers have incentive to narrow the proportion of property value of land owners. Then I raise some methods to reduce the preceding transaction cost, but all of them will increase other transaction cost. Although the profit of implementing urban renewal with the rights transformation is so high, the costs of doing so are too heavy for the traditional joint construction agreement to bear. It’ll depend on each specific case to tell whether it’s better to adopt traditional joint construction agreement or urban renewal with rights transformation.
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