The Relationship between Managerial Ability and Incentive Compensation- the Evidence from Electronic Industry
碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 會計學系 === 102 === In agency theory, shareholders will hire managers to manage complex operation and reach the business goal. The dilemma will exist because managers sometimes will make his own interest rather than shareholders’, and bring about loss to entity. To avoid entity loss,...
Main Authors: | Hu, Meng-Han, 胡孟涵 |
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Other Authors: | Chu, Hsuan-Lien |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2014
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Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/56c5fx |
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