The Effects of Corporate Governance Characteristics on Information Transfers

• Main Authors: Ku, Hsin-Chiao, 古欣巧
• Other Authors: Huang , Chung-Huey
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2013
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/52564629103308104440

碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 會計學系 === 102 === Since Ball and Brown confirmed information content, many domestic and foreign scholars began to study the relationship between earnings and stock price.The release of earnings does not only affect their own company share price but also affect the price of other companies in the same industry due to the homogeneity of the industry. That is called information transfer. In addition, many corporate scandals happened in recent years and investors suffered heavy losses.Each countries government began to advocate importance of corporate governance. Therefore, this study investigates the effects of corporate governance characteristics on investor decisions from the perspective of information transfers. The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and information transfers. The sample period is from 2006 to 2012. It investigates the internal mechanisms of corporate governance impact on investors by corporate governance framework through three dimensions, ownership structure, board characteristics, institutional investors. In order to understand the relationship between information transparency and investor decisions, this study uses the result of information disclosure and transparency rankings system in Taiwan as a proxy for information transparency in external mechanisms of corporate governance. The empirical results show the existence of intra-industry information transfer phenomenon. When the ratio of board seats held by the members of the largest shareholders is higher, the effect of information transfers is weaken. When the divergence between the largest owner’s control and cash-flow rights is lesser, the effect of information transfers is weaken. When the ratio of independent director seats held by the members of the largest shareholders , the effect of information transfers is weaken. When the ratio of independent supervisor seats held by the members of the largest shareholders are higher, the effect of information transfers is weaken. However, the larger size of the board and the higher proportion of institutional ownership will strengthen the information transfer effect.