Efficient Attestation Collection in Proof of Violation with Multiple Chains of Hash

• Main Authors: Yu-Wei Lin, 林裕偉
• Other Authors: Gwan-Hwan Hwang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/15597140692406506956

碩士 === 國立臺灣師範大學 === 資訊工程學系 === 102 === A POV scheme enables a user or a service provider to produce a precise proof of either the occurrence of the violation of properties or the innocence of the service provider. These proofs are based on attestations, which are signed messages that bind the users to the requests they make and the service provider to maintaining the data in a certain state. Users and the service provider exchange attestations for every request. These attestations are chain hashed so that the client device of the user only has to store the last attestation it received, which contains the last chain hash. The service provider keeps all the attestations, so that they can be used when auditing (or proving) is required. While the C&;L scheme can achieve epoch-based POV without the need for client devices to broadcast the latest attestation or keep all the attestations, it cannot support concurrent accesses even though these operations access different files because all the server-side attestations need to be combined into a single chain. We solve this problem by employing multiple chains of hash to provide concurrent file accesses in a single account.