The Agency Problem of Family Firms

• Main Authors: Yu-ting Lin, 林宥廷
• Other Authors: Ya-yi Chao
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/29536874017751206937

碩士 === 國立高雄第一科技大學 === 會計資訊研究所 === 102 === 　　According to the research of the past, the types of firms are controlled over the family in Asian countries, so this study aims to explore the relevance of the family firms, agency problems and firm performance. This study aims to the agency costs between family and non-family firms, and to further explore the impact of a variety of oversight mechanisms of corporate governance on agency problems, and whether effective oversight mechanism can reduce the agency costs of debt or equity to enhance corporate value. The results indicate that when family involved in the management of the firm business, the traditional agency problem relatively non-family firms is low, and family firms through of unlisted companies can maintain then their control stake increase the degree of equity deviation. In the agency costs of debt, the family firms have low debt agency costs. But the agency costs of debt will increase when family actively participate in family business management.In the firm performance, the family firms have higher business performance, relatively non-family firms. Finally. The different governance mechanisms can effectively reduce the cost of different agency problems, and also help to improve corporate value.