| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立彰化師範大學 === 會計學系 === 102 === This study analyzed chairmans’ salary data from 2006 to 2012. After determining whether the chair salaries were abnormally low, we investigated how having company chairs who receive abnormally low salaries or no salary influences company performance and accounting conservatism. We separately used Basu’s (1997) earnings-return regression method and Beaver and Ryan’s (2000) net asset method to measure accounting conservatism. The corporate objectives, shareholding structures, and investment efficiencies of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in Mainland China are diverse. Thus, in this study, state-owned enterprise and private enterprise samples were distinguished in the analyses.
The empirical results showed that state-owned enterprises with chairman who received abnormally low compensation or zero compensation generated reduced company performance. This result can be attributed to reduced supervision or intensified consumption on the job when chairs receive abnormally low compensation or zero compensation which consequently damages company performance. When the chairman of private enterprises received abnormally low compensation, company performance increased after manipulation. Regarding accounting conservatism, when we measure of conservatism based on Basu (1997) asymmetric timelines of earnings model, we don’t obtain the evidence of the relationship between the accounting conservatism and abnormally low or zero compensation. Finally, applying the net asset method showed that when the chairman of state-owned enterprises received abnormally low compensation or no compensation, accounting conservatism increased; however, when the chairman of private enterprises received no compensation, accounting conservatism decreased.
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