The Agency Problem, Corporate Governance, and Stickiness of SG&;A Costs
碩士 === 國立中央大學 === 會計研究所 === 102 === Abstract Prior studies have predominantly explained cost stickiness with economic factors and have largely ignored the impact of managerial incentives on cost behavior. Therefore, this study is to examine the manager’s empire building incentives that lead to SG&am...
Main Authors: | Fang-ru Lee, 李芳如 |
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Other Authors: | 陳建中 |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2014
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/h5728d |
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