The earnings management behavior comparison between spin-off and equity carve out companies
碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 會計學系 === 102 === This paper examines the difference in earnings management behavior between corporate spinoffs and equity carve-outs. We argue that these two kinds of firms with higher levels of information asymmetry and cash constraints will be more likely to engage in earnings ma...
Main Authors: | , |
---|---|
Other Authors: | |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2014
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/gpbt38 |
id |
ndltd-TW-102NCKU5385034 |
---|---|
record_format |
oai_dc |
spelling |
ndltd-TW-102NCKU53850342019-05-15T21:42:46Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/gpbt38 The earnings management behavior comparison between spin-off and equity carve out companies 資產分割與權益分割盈餘管理行為的比較 Jia-JunXu 徐嘉駿 碩士 國立成功大學 會計學系 102 This paper examines the difference in earnings management behavior between corporate spinoffs and equity carve-outs. We argue that these two kinds of firms with higher levels of information asymmetry and cash constraints will be more likely to engage in earnings management. The sample used in our research consists of all firms from the U.S. that engaged in spin offs or equity carve-outs between 1990 and 2007, and we also match them with control firms in the same industry. The empirical results indicate that corporate spinoffs and equity carve-outs are more likely to result in earnings manipulation as compared to the control firm, especially in the case of the equity carve-outs firms, the behavior of which is significantly influenced by information asymmetry and cash constraints. Yu-Chen Lin 林囿成 2014 學位論文 ; thesis 36 zh-TW |
collection |
NDLTD |
language |
zh-TW |
format |
Others
|
sources |
NDLTD |
description |
碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 會計學系 === 102 === This paper examines the difference in earnings management behavior between corporate spinoffs and equity carve-outs. We argue that these two kinds of firms with higher levels of information asymmetry and cash constraints will be more likely to engage in earnings management. The sample used in our research consists of all firms from the U.S. that engaged in spin offs or equity carve-outs between 1990 and 2007, and we also match them with control firms in the same industry. The empirical results indicate that corporate spinoffs and equity carve-outs are more likely to result in earnings manipulation as compared to the control firm, especially in the case of the equity carve-outs firms, the behavior of which is significantly influenced by information asymmetry and cash constraints.
|
author2 |
Yu-Chen Lin |
author_facet |
Yu-Chen Lin Jia-JunXu 徐嘉駿 |
author |
Jia-JunXu 徐嘉駿 |
spellingShingle |
Jia-JunXu 徐嘉駿 The earnings management behavior comparison between spin-off and equity carve out companies |
author_sort |
Jia-JunXu |
title |
The earnings management behavior comparison between spin-off and equity carve out companies |
title_short |
The earnings management behavior comparison between spin-off and equity carve out companies |
title_full |
The earnings management behavior comparison between spin-off and equity carve out companies |
title_fullStr |
The earnings management behavior comparison between spin-off and equity carve out companies |
title_full_unstemmed |
The earnings management behavior comparison between spin-off and equity carve out companies |
title_sort |
earnings management behavior comparison between spin-off and equity carve out companies |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/gpbt38 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT jiajunxu theearningsmanagementbehaviorcomparisonbetweenspinoffandequitycarveoutcompanies AT xújiājùn theearningsmanagementbehaviorcomparisonbetweenspinoffandequitycarveoutcompanies AT jiajunxu zīchǎnfēngēyǔquányìfēngēyíngyúguǎnlǐxíngwèidebǐjiào AT xújiājùn zīchǎnfēngēyǔquányìfēngēyíngyúguǎnlǐxíngwèidebǐjiào AT jiajunxu earningsmanagementbehaviorcomparisonbetweenspinoffandequitycarveoutcompanies AT xújiājùn earningsmanagementbehaviorcomparisonbetweenspinoffandequitycarveoutcompanies |
_version_ |
1719118788593451008 |