| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 工業與資訊管理學系 === 102 === This thesis studies a two-echelon supply chain in which a dominant system service provider supplies homogenous products to two competitive retailers, who sell them to the end customers. Customer demand depends on retailer price and service level provided by the system service provider. We develop a game-theoretic model to understand interactions between a system service provider and the horizontally competitive retailers. In addition, we establish a quantity-discount contract that enables a system service provider to coordinate the supply chain and maximizes the profits available to the firms. Through this coordination mechanism, we demonstrate that the joint profit of the supply chain will be consistent with the optimal profit in the centralized supply chain when the fixed franchise fee paid by the retailers to system service provider is set within the specific threshold values. Furthermore, we show that how the parameters change will impact the equilibrium strategies and the difference in retail and joint profits. We provide comparison and analyses of the analytical results by using parameter analysis, and derive the managerial insights for the system service industry.
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