| Summary: | 博士 === 國立中興大學 === 國際政治研究所 === 102 === Competition versus cooperation or wars versus peace have always happened alternately between states since the international system was established along with the progress of history. After the Peace Treaty of Westphalia was signed, although there were some wars and conflicts, even the Cold War, they were disappeared eventually and the international system is still here. The time of international cooperation is more than international conflict which is approved by regional integration, so the new regionalism has prevailed since 1980. There are following three characteristics about international cooperation and new regionalism: (1) the international cooperation happens again after the great power declined; (2) The types of international cooperation are gradually changing; (3) When the trends of regional economic integration are progressing, the new regionalism comes into being with time. These three motives are main background of this research.
This research adopts an international cooperation viewpoint to discuss the following regional economic integration issues: 1. Does international cooperation need hegemonic power? If hegemony is not the only necessary condition to achieve international cooperation, then what is? 2. How to establish a theoretical framework with the country’s interests as a foundation to explain the possible expansion and change of the types of international cooperation? 3. While each regional economic organization has its own agenda, it is interesting and beneficial to evaluate the differences and motives of cooperation and integration among various regional economic organizations. 4. Given these differences and the possibilities of cooperation amongst these regional economic organizations, what is the strategic thinking of Taiwan while in joint with Asia-Pacific regional cooperation? This research tries to adopt infinite game approach and structural interest logic and integrate the concept of “vertical interests” and “horizontal interests.” In doing so, the model will be transferred into “the existing interests” and “the future virtual interests.” By using this created model, it can help answer the previous two questions. In addition, this research will also establish five indicators, including culture diversity, information gap, geographic distance, development distance, and political factors, to help answer the last two questions as well as provide better strategic thinking for Taiwanese government while joining some regional economic organizations.
The prisoners’ dilemma is one of key points of international cooperation study, so how to break through the dilemma is the research’s approach. We use the TIT-for-TAT logic to transfer an infinite game into a model. The model applies “the existing interest” and “the future virtual interest” instead of an accumulation interest of infinite games by TIT-for-TAT. Then we add five indexes for the ratio of virtual interest to explain the international cooperation and regional cooperation. Through this model for the research, we could get at least four expected purposes: (1) constructing a synthetic theory of international region cooperation; (2) With regard to cooperation degree between different international regions, we would achieve more comprehensive comparisons and more detail understandings; (3) This study could provide strategic thinking and alternatives for Taiwan when it prepare to attend some regional cooperation organization and (4) providing policy suggestion to Taiwan government through domestic politics level and international structure level.
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