The Effects of Board Size and Board Independence on Board Compensation and Manager Compensation

• Main Authors: Chia-Jung Hu, 胡珈榕
• Other Authors: Shuh-Chyi Doong
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2014
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/43332013278324677867

碩士 === 國立中興大學 === 財務金融系所 === 102 === After the 2008 financial crisis, many financial institutions have been condemned of rewarding their employees by the received bailouts from the government. As a result, "Fat cat" issue has gradually come to the surface; and the compensation system of a corporation has been regarded as a priority in today’s society. This study examines the effects of the composition of the board on compensation system of the board of director and managers. The sample of the study is drawn from the listed companies from 2005 to 2011 of the Taiwanese companies and OTC companies. The sample has been examined with three comparisons. First, we divided sample into family-run and non-family-run business, and subdivide non-family-run business into association, government and manager companies. Second, we group the companies in which their directors can also behave as the managers. Third, we put the companies into five groups according to different companies’ operation scales (Size1, Size2, Size3, Size4 and Size5). The findings suggest that the amount of the members in the board has a negative impact on the compensation system; however, it has a positive effect on compensation system for managers. Besides, the independence of the board is negatively related with its compensation system, but board independence has positive effects on that of manager compensation.