CEO Turnover, CEO Compensation and Initial Public Offerings
碩士 === 元智大學 === 商學碩士班(財務金融學程) === 101 === This thesis investigates why the CEO is turned over after the period of Initial Public Offerings. First, we find that factors, such as CEO age, the role of founder, CEO Ownership, insiders’ ownership, firm size and profitability, determine the CEO turnover a...
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ndltd-TW-101YZU053040552016-03-18T04:41:40Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/04119635857491229296 CEO Turnover, CEO Compensation and Initial Public Offerings CEO替換,CEO薪酬與首次公開發行 Ya-Hsuang Chuang 莊雅璇 碩士 元智大學 商學碩士班(財務金融學程) 101 This thesis investigates why the CEO is turned over after the period of Initial Public Offerings. First, we find that factors, such as CEO age, the role of founder, CEO Ownership, insiders’ ownership, firm size and profitability, determine the CEO turnover after IPO. Therefore, corporate governance mechanisms have effect on CEO turnover of IPO firm. Second, historical studies also provide empirical results that CEOs have a motivation to sell their owned stocks after IPO. Because CEOs of IPO have more inside information than outsiders, we wish to observe the correlation between CEO’s selling stock and their future turnover after IPO. The empirical result shows that the relationship between CEOs’ selling their owned stocks and their future turnover during five years after IPO is weakly positive. Thus, CEO selling their owned stocks may be more likely related to diversify their investment. Shin-Rong Shiah-Hou 夏侯欣榮 學位論文 ; thesis 32 en_US |
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碩士 === 元智大學 === 商學碩士班(財務金融學程) === 101 === This thesis investigates why the CEO is turned over after the period of Initial Public Offerings. First, we find that factors, such as CEO age, the role of founder, CEO Ownership, insiders’ ownership, firm size and profitability, determine the CEO turnover after IPO. Therefore, corporate governance mechanisms have effect on CEO turnover of IPO firm. Second, historical studies also provide empirical results that CEOs have a motivation to sell their owned stocks after IPO. Because CEOs of IPO have more inside information than outsiders, we wish to observe the correlation between CEO’s selling stock and their future turnover after IPO. The empirical result shows that the relationship between CEOs’ selling their owned stocks and their future turnover during five years after IPO is weakly positive. Thus, CEO selling their owned stocks may be more likely related to diversify their investment.
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Shin-Rong Shiah-Hou |
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Shin-Rong Shiah-Hou Ya-Hsuang Chuang 莊雅璇 |
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Ya-Hsuang Chuang 莊雅璇 |
spellingShingle |
Ya-Hsuang Chuang 莊雅璇 CEO Turnover, CEO Compensation and Initial Public Offerings |
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Ya-Hsuang Chuang |
title |
CEO Turnover, CEO Compensation and Initial Public Offerings |
title_short |
CEO Turnover, CEO Compensation and Initial Public Offerings |
title_full |
CEO Turnover, CEO Compensation and Initial Public Offerings |
title_fullStr |
CEO Turnover, CEO Compensation and Initial Public Offerings |
title_full_unstemmed |
CEO Turnover, CEO Compensation and Initial Public Offerings |
title_sort |
ceo turnover, ceo compensation and initial public offerings |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/04119635857491229296 |
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